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Integrating a Market-Based Model in Trust-Based Service Systems
Suronapee Phoomvuthisarn, Yan Liu , Liming Zhu, and Ross Jeffery
Abstract: The reputation-based trust mechanism is a way to assess the trustworthiness of offered services, based
on the feedback obtained from their users. In the absence of appropriate safeguards, service users can still
manipulate this feedback. Auction mechanisms have already addressed the problem of manipulation by markettrading participants. When auction mechanisms are applied to trust systems, their interaction with the trust systems
and associated overhead need to be quantitatively evaluated. This paper proposes two distributed architectures
based on centralized and hybrid computing for integrating an auction mechanism with the trust systems. The
empirical evaluation demonstrates how the architectures help to discourage users from giving untruthful feedback
and reduce the overhead costs of the auction mechanisms.
Key words: trust systems; software architecture; economic mechanisms

1

Introduction

Service oriented applications are highly distributed
and loosely coupled with less central authority over
participating for services. These services have a high
degree of autonomy, and hence most of them can
arbitrarily claim service properties such as Quality of
Service (QoS) in order to attract service users. This
poses a number of risks to service users, who might end
up selecting a poor-quality or even malicious service
to cooperate. The Reputation-Based Trust mechanism
(hereafter, the RBT) is one of the trust mechanisms
commonly used for minimizing the risks of interactions
between participating services[1, 2] . This mechanism
assumes that individual service users (or “raters” —
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service users that rationally provide ratings to other
services) can leave feedback such as ratings on services
that they have previously consumed[1] . These ratings
can be accumulated into a meaningful reputation to
assess the trustworthiness of offered services.
There is, however, evidence that such feedback can
be manipulated[1, 3-5] . Some service users lie in their
feedback intentionally to gain benefits from the biased
reputation that they establish, thus compromising the
reputation produced by the RBT.
Economic mechanisms such as auctions are capable
of addressing the problem of cheating behavior,
even when the majority of market-trading participants
lie. Unlike other approaches for preventing cheating,
the auction mechanisms’ aim is to make sure lie does
not gain, where the measure of gain for each bidder is
independent of the majority of bids from others[6] . This
property enforces each participant to report the truth
no matter how others act, and discourages dishonest
raters from gaining benefits even when they are
in a majority. Recognizing the merits of auction
mechanisms, this paper incorporates them into a trust
negotiation protocol. The aim is to provide the extra
capability for trust systems to discourage raters from
cheating when they provide ratings to other services.
Supporting these additional auction mechanisms

Suronapee Phoomvuthisarn et al.: Integrating a Market-Based Model in Trust-Based Service Systems

555

within trust-based service systems necessitates a
suitable distributed architecture for integration. This
architecture ensures the following four trust systems’
quality attributes:
 Extensibility. The trust system can keep their
normal functionalities without incurring unaffordable
overhead when integrating with the auction mechanism;
 Scalability. The overall architecture is highly
scalable when leveraging the auction mechanism that
was originally designed for economics of a centralized
nature;
 Decentralization. The system can capture the
truth-telling property of the auction mechanism in
distributed environments;
 Performance. The architecture ensures an
affordable response time.
Therefore, an architecture design to address above
challenges needs to be rigorously evaluated.
This paper presents two architecture implementations
for integrating an auction mechanism with trust
systems. The first architecture embeds the auction
mechanism within a trust system that coordinates
all the raters with a central coordinator. To make
the architecture further scalable, a hybrid architecture
is designed to place the auction mechanism at
distributed services. Without a central coordinator,
each service needs to calculate and share its trust
ratings to others. The quality of each architecture
design is evaluated according to above four quality
attributes of extensibility, scalability, decentralization,
and performance. The contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, we provide an architectural approach to
integrating auction mechanisms with trust systems to
discourage raters from providing untruthful ratings to
other services, even in scenarios where the majority of
them are dishonest. Second, we evaluate this approach
with two architecture designs and compare quality
attributes with empirical experiments.

Vickrey Auction Mechanism (hereafter, the VAM)[9] .
The VAM’s rules are simple. Bidders place their bids
for a particular item and hand them sealed to the
auctioneer. The winner of the auction is the one who
places the highest bid and pays the exact amount of the
second highest bid. After the auction, the reward and
punishment are conducted based on the utility gain (i.e.,
the monetary gain after the auction) computed for each
bidder. The utility gain represented as money for the
winner is calculated by the difference between his or
her true valuation for the item and the second highest
bid in the auction, while the utility for other bidders is
zero as follows:
(
vi Maxj ¤i .bj /; if bi > Maxj ¤i .bj /I
ui D
0;
otherwise
(1)
The VAM principle ensures that reporting the true
valuation maximizes the utility[9] . Bidders who submit
untruthful bids will not gain, and are sometimes
penalized. The property of the VAM encourages a
bidder to reveal the truth no matter how others
act[8] . Also, the VAM’s costs of computation are
minimal because the modeling of participants’ behavior
is simple and easy to implement. Furthermore, it
does not require complex knowledge of how other
participants behave. This lightweight nature of the VAM
is promising to satisfy the above four quality attributes
required in the integration architecture.
In this paper, besides the VAM, we also incorporate
the Reverse Vickrey Auction Mechanism (hereafter, the
RVAM) as a solution to the unfairness nature of the
VAM. This generally happens when some raters who
submit a very low but truthful bid have less chance
to win the auction. The measure of gain based on the
RVAM is in a reverse order between the true valuation
of the winning bidder who submits the lowest bid and
the second lowest bid in the auction.

2

The VAM is feasible to discourage raters from cheating
in trust-based domains; however, integrating the VAM
within trust systems poses architectural challenges
on balancing the quality attributes of extensibility,
scalability, decentralization, and performance. From the
architectural point of view, there are four concerns
raised as follows.
2.2.1 Extensibility

2.1

Background
Economic mechanisms

Economics is a social science that studies how humans
make choices on allocating scarce resources to satisfy
their unlimited wants[7] . Its mechanisms designed for
marketplaces have already addressed the issue of
discouraging market-trading participants from cheating
behavior[8] . One economic mechanism that yields truthtelling properties of market-trading participants is the

2.2

Architectural challenges

The first aspect is to achieve good separation of
concerns. Auctioning messages incurred by the VAM
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(e.g., sending, receiving, calculation, notification, etc.)
might introduce tight couplings between the trust
components and the VAM components, thus degrading
the extensibility of the trust system itself. Trust
and the VAM components should reduce the overlap
in functionality so that modifications to the trust
components or replacement of the VAM components
can be maintained without reengineering other parts of
the architecture.
Besides, the VAM’s key characteristics need to be
captured in the deployed trust-based scenario. Each
rater has preferences to choose strategies that maximize
its utilities. Hence, the architecture should handle
varying preferences for all strategies to ensure that
submitting unfair ratings cannot provide benefits to
unfair raters. In addition, the resource each participant
puts into the auction depends on each strategy
the participant performs. This requires the relations
between the strategies and their required resources
captured by relevant trust components and the VAM
components in the architecture.
2.2.2

Scalability

The original VAM auction mechanism assumes a
centralized environment in which a central coordinator
takes care of all auctioning computation. When
integrated with the trust system, a centralized
architecture provides a common interface by which
raters can issue their bids through auctions. Such a
system therefore has limitations to scale and handle the
increased load of raters. This centralized infrastructure
is not suitable for ultra-large scale service environment
where the number of potential services is huge. This
necessitates a distributed trust system that can handle
bids from raters independently so that raters are not
blocked while their bids are executed in the auctioning
process.
2.2.3

Decentralization

To achieve better scalability, the VAM can be
embedded with distributed services without a
central coordinator. Consequently, each service
needs to calculate and share their information
to others. However, capturing the VAM’s truthtelling property in this environment is not
straightforward. Traditional VAM is suitable for
a class of problems where bidders’ budgets are
unlimited[10] . Without central authority, a distributed
service environment lacks the overall knowledge of
individual’s budgets. Hence, services may take an

underbidding strategy to gain remote resources. As
a result, the VAM’s property to prevent lying may
be broken. Moreover, reporting the VAM outcome
is not trivial since the results need to be distributed
to dynamic raters, which is not a known priori, or
may even change over time as a service joins or
leaves. Obviously, explicit polling by the VAM for
notification incurs communication overhead. All lead
to the challenge of capturing the VAM’s truth-telling
property in decentralized architecture.
2.2.4

Performance

The last aspect is to reduce overhead as discussed in the
above challenge of decentralization. When the number
of participating services involved is very high, the
volume of messages exchanged between the VAM and
trust components might incur significant overhead. This
imposes a further research question in the architectural
design: how to leverage the VAM’s benefits to prevent
raters from cheating, while reducing the end-to-end
delay incurred by the VAM messages. The resulting
architecture should be optimized to reduce this traffic
overhead significantly.

3

The Architecture

This section presents two VAM-based architectures to
discourage raters from cheating, namely centralized
and hybrid computing architecture. These VAMbased architectures are demonstrated through two case
studies. Each case has its own emphasis on specific
quality attributes. They are then compared to find
optimal architectural solutions. The use of case studies
provides insights on how these architectures can be
extended with the VAM.
3.1

Centralized architecture

This centralized architecture relies on the system’s trust
manager embedding with the VAM’s capabilities to help
a requester find a set of potential providing services that
have high reputations so as to assist the choice of their
cooperation.
3.1.1

Case description

The case follows the supply chain scenario, where
a customer service (acting as a requester) intends to
find potential providing services in the line of supply
chain including retailer, warehouse, and manufacturer
services to negotiate. To complete this line of business,
the customer has to submit an order consisting of line
items to a retailer service. Each line item identifies
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a product and the corresponding quantity to be
ordered. To fulfill orders, the retailer goes through each
line item and finds a warehouse service with sufficient
stock to ship them. The warehouse then ships the line
item to the customer.
To manage stock levels in the warehouse, each
warehouse needs to restock from the inventory of a
relevant manufacturer service whenever its inventory
levels fall below the minimum of inventory levels
for a particular product. To choose the best deal
available among all the providing services (i.e., retailer,
warehouse, and manufacturer services) that have
similar functions, the requesting service (i.e., customer,
chosen retailer, and chosen warehouse service) sends
a trust system the request asking for the reputation
of relevant providers on how well they can provide
their QoS information as claimed. Since each service is
independent of the services or resources it provides[11] ,
the interactions between participating services have the
risks of failure, such as time delay and not always
accessible within the promised timeline. Therefore, the
overall performance QoS attributes, including response
time, waiting time, and availability, can be used in this
scenario.
The VAM comes into play in this context to
motivate each rater to reveal the rating faithfully. In
the case of this supply chain, the customer service
invokes the central trust system to evaluate each
retailer’s trustworthiness before sending the list of
line items. Once having taken a decision for choosing
one retailer, the chosen retailer then invokes the trust
system to evaluate each warehouse’s trustworthiness
before ordering a shipment from one warehouse. If the
chosen warehouse’s stock is needed to be refilled, the
warehouse then invokes the trust system to evaluate
each manufacturer’s trustworthiness before ordering a
product from the manufacturer.
3.1.2

Architecture layers

Conceptually, the architecture of a trust system has
three layers to compose the key components, namely
service layer, trust layer, and service metadata layer as
depicted in Fig. 1.
The service layer performs bootstrapping, which
receives ratings from raters. The trust layer prevents
accumulation of unfair ratings. This layer consists of the
trust engine to calculate trust-related information, such
as a trust level of certain services, and the reputation
engine to provide a robust reputation. The service

Fig. 1
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Auction-based centralized architecture.

metadata layer contains the service registry to support
the VAM’s reward and punishment process made to
raters. The registry is extended to capture the reputation
of registered services. In addition, a database is used to
store trust-related information such as trust parameters.
3.1.3

Auction-based trust negotiation protocol

The steps of the VAM are embedded in the trust
negotiation protocol, to guide the interactions between
key components across three service layers.
At Stage one, interrogation, a requester at the
service layer finds providing services that meet its
functional requirements. The requester checks the trust
level of the discovered providers through Stage two,
negotiation. Once receiving the requests from the trust
engine for calculating the trust level of a provider, the
reasoning manager then instructs the auction engine to
perform the auction-based calculation. The calculation
steps are shown in Fig. 2.
(1) Auction engine initiates a new auction round
(one auction per each provider requested) by setting an
auction time and aggregates ratings from raters. The
auction engine encapsulates the auction logic in the
VAM component, which computes the utility gain of
participating raters based on Eq. (1) (Section 2.1). This
utility gain is input to the reasoning manager to
make the decision on a reward to fair raters or some
punishment to unfair raters. To calculate this utility,
in addition to the second highest bid captured in the
auction, the true value of the rating submitted by the
winning rater is required (see Eq. (1)).
(2) Auction engine terminates the auction.
(3) Reasoning manager sends all values of ratings
already excluded to the auction engine.
(4) Auction engine finds the winning rater and
instructs the controller to monitor the winner’s true
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Fig. 2

Trust negotiation protocol in centralized architecture.

value. In this paper the term “the winning rater” refers
to the raters who submit the highest rating (in the VAM
process) and the lowest rating (in the RVAM process) in
the auction.
(5) Controller monitors the winning rater’s true
value.
(6) Auction engine instructs the VAM component to
perform utility computation.
(7) Auction engine then announces the winning rater
and its utility through the reasoning manager.
(8) Reasoning manager performs the VAM’s reward
and punishment process and updates the newly raters’
reputation to the service registry.
(9) Reasoning manager then calculates the provider’s
reputation.
The trust engine then uses the provider’s reputation
produced by the reasoning manager to calculate
the provider’s trust level. Once the computation is
completed, the calculated trust level is then returned to
the requester to determine whether each provider’s trust
level exceeds the requester’s minimal trust threshold to
further negotiate.
At Stage three, interaction, the requester negotiates
with a chosen provider to interact with. The requester
and the chosen provider use the trust system as a
mediator to establish the trust negotiation between
them. At Stage four, termination, once completely
consuming the chosen provider’s service, the requester
ends trust negotiation with the chosen provider.
3.2

Hybrid architecture

In the previous case study, the VAM-based centralized
architecture makes all the decisions in one place. This

poses a scalability issue when concurrent raters are
participating with the central trust system at the
same time. Simply decentralizing the architectural
components in the centralized architecture to each
participating service cannot solve this scalability issue,
since query messages incurred by the auction-based
trust negotiation protocol might induce a large volume
of traffic overhead due to the end-to-end delay. Our
solution is to the combination of them into a hybrid
computing architecture.
3.2.1

Case description

The supply chain scenario is further extended to explore
the hybrid computing architecture. In Fig. 3, each of
registry services maintains the centralized architecture
presented in Section 3.1. Each registry service has its
service indexes and implements the VAM protocol in
the trust manager.
Each service registry acts as a broker and
communicates with each other in a decentralized
manner to find potential providers (i.e., retailer,
warehouse, and manufacturer services) for a
requester. After receiving a list of relevant providers
from registries’ peers, the registry invokes its trust
manager to evaluate the trustworthiness of these
providers.
3.2.2

Architecture layers

Figure 4 shows the architecture of hybrid computing. It
mainly consists of a set of service registries, each
of which acts as a central server in resolving a
query message for a requesting service. These service
registries maintain a set of their own services registered
to the trust system using indexing scheme in the
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Fig. 3

Supply chain scenario in hybrid computing.

Fig. 4

The VAM architecture for hybrid computing.

service description database, and communicate with
each other in a P2P manner. In this nature, propagation
of messages between individual services only occurs
within a small population of service registries, which
help to reduce the messages communicated by the VAM
protocol.
Consequently, each service’s registry component
communicates with other services across four service
layers, namely application layer, queuing layer, trust
layer, and service metadata layer.
The application layer handles an incoming request
from requesting services as well as an outgoing request
from a service registry. It interacts with the registry’s
own registered services and other peers of the registry
in resolving the query message of a requester. The
layer also receives ratings submitted by raters in the
auctioning process through the discovery manager.
The queuing layer aims to reduce a runtime overhead
incurred by interchange messages passing between the
application layer and the trust layer. It consists of (1)

559

the service caching to previously store evaluated results
of a requester’s incoming request, (2) the queue list to
store the ratings of raters when the application cannot
concurrently process them, and (3) the scheduler engine
to schedule the execution of these ratings according to
a specific set of constraints.
The trust layer incorporates components to prevent
accumulation of unfair ratings. This layer consists of
two key components: (1) the trust manager from the
centralized architecture is reused to produce a trust
level or reputation of providing services accumulated
from truthful ratings in the VAM process; while
(2) the matchmaking manager is a broker for a
registry to interact with the discovery manager, the
service description database, and the trust manager for
evaluating the trustworthiness of a providing service.
The service metadata layer stores trust data in the
system. The repositories, including trust repository and
reputation repository are reused from the centralized
architecture. Since each service registry interacts with
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each other in a decentralized manner, the reputation
repositories consist of both (1) the local reputation
repository to store the reputation of raters in which
the registry itself is responsible for, and (2) the
global reputation repository to store the reputation of
other raters organized by its set of registries’ trusted
neighbors (registries’ peers). The layer also contains a
service description database to store service information
indexed when services register to the system.
To propagate changes among shared data (e.g., raters’
reputation credits), the proxy offers an observer-based
change notification mechanism in which the global
reputation repository is the subject and each registry’s
trust manager as the observer. The proxy can trigger
the trust manager of each registry to be notified about
the changes of raters’ budget when they participate in
multiple auctions through its own reasoning manager.
3.2.3

Auction-based trust negotiation protocol

The auction-based trust negotiation protocol consists
of the following five stages: initiation, matching,
interrogation, negotiation, and interaction. This
protocol interacts between a requester and a service
registry to choose a provider for the requester with
which to cooperate as shown in Fig. 5.
At Stage one, initiation, the discovery manager
receives a requester’s query message, and then instructs
the matchmaking manager to resolve the request for a
relevant provider.
At Stage two, matching, when the matchmaking

Fig. 5

manager receives the query message, it first checks
its local cache for relevant providing services that
can meet the requester’s requirements in the query
message. If the number of matching providers is
not enough for the requester, it then forwards the
query message to other registries’ peers. Once it has
received a sufficient number of relevant providers, the
matchmaking manager then keeps the list of these
providers for evaluating their trustworthiness.
At Stage three, interrogation, after receiving a list
of relevant providers, if the service registry has enough
experience with those providers, it can choose one or a
set of the providers that it trusts most for the requester.
Otherwise, the service registry requests raters’ opinions
about the reputation of these providers. To compute
these reputations, the reasoning manager instructs the
auction engine to initialize auction services to gather
all values of ratings from raters. The auction-based
calculation follows the similar steps of the protocol
in the centralized architecture. After calculating the
reputations of the potential providers, the trust engine
then uses these reputations to calculate their trust level,
which is used to determine whether each provider’s trust
level exceeds the requester’s trust threshold for further
negotiation.
At Stage four, negotiation, the requester then
establishes a trust negotiation with the chosen provider
directly to get its service. At Stage five, interaction,
after the trust negotiation is established, the requester
then gets the chosen provider’s service.

Trust negotiation protocol in hybrid architecture.
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4

Architecture Deployment

In order to realize the VAM-based architectures, this
paper uses JXTA (2003), an open source peer-to-peer
protocol specification initiated by Sun Microsystems,
as a platform for web service publication and
discovery infrastructure. Compared to other distributed
web service discovery, JXTA provides service group
concurrent searching by aggregating a search result
of each service group, thus its architecture is suitable
for web service discovery and selection process
that requires highly efficient searching[12] . The JXTA
network (Sun Microsystems, 2003) is built out of
five key abstractions—uniform peer ID addressing,
peer groups, advertisements, resolver, and pipes—that
provide a generic infrastructure to deploy P2P services
and applications. The deployment of the VAM-based
architectures is as follow.
4.1

Centralized architecture

The architecture deployment is shown in Fig. 6. All
services including the all raters and all services
are deployed as JXTA edge nodes hosted by the
Apache AXIS 1.0 Web Server. All raters and retailer,
warehouse, and manufacturer services interact with
the trust-based service application via the Web service
deployed in the IIS 5.0 Web Server that receives service
requests and sends responses from the application.
The trust engine and the reputation engine are
developed as Java EJBs and deployed as the single trustbased application hosted by the Tomcat Application
Server.
This Application Server processes requests from the
Web Server and sends responses back to the Web
Server.

Fig. 6

Deployment of centralized architecture.

561

The Application Server implements the auctionbased trust negotiation protocol. It communicates with
services and the service registry using SOAP messages
and connects to the SQL Database Server using the
JDBC driver. The service registry implements LDAP
components to support service registration.
4.2

Hybrid architecture

The architecture deployment is shown in Fig. 7. All
services including customers, retailers, warehouses,
manufacturers are built using JXTA relay nodes with 3
friends per peer. They are randomly assigned to one of
the service registry deployed as rendezvous nodes with
each having its own trust manager. With a rendezvous
capability, a service registry can maintain an index
of advertisement published by providing services to
discovery requests using a Shared Resource Distributed
Index (SRDI) (Sun Microsystems, 2003). These service
registries keep this random list of their registry’s peers
ranging from 1 to 10 peers and maintain a maximum
number of 50 registered services per registry. These
registries interact with all raters through auctions
processed by their associated trust managers that
receive ratings or any service requests.
The components of the trust managers and the
Application Server are implemented and deployed the
same way as the centralized architecture.

5

Evaluation

The architectural framework presented in Section 3 is
now applied to three test cases as follows:
 The VAM property test Unfair raters should get
a penalty, especially when the majority of them lie about
their ratings.
 The performance test evaluates overhead of the
devised architecture integrated with the VAM. The
test implements two prototypes with and without the

Fig. 7

Deployment of hybrid architecture.
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VAM deployed and observes the overhead cost for each
deployment.
 The scalability test evaluates the extent to which
the VAM-based architectures can scale in terms of
interacting raters. The test is to compare the response
time of two architectures (centralized vs hybrid) when
the number of interacting raters increases.
5.1

Test setup

The test environment includes two identical Windows
XP machines with 3 GHz Core 2 Duo processors and
3.25 GB of RAM. One is used for hosting all raters’
services, and the other hosts the rest of the application.
The auction process initially involves 50 raters for
each case study. The raters are grouped into two groups:
fair and unfair raters. A fair rater offers QoS ratings
to a provider just as it is perceived while an unfair
rater randomly offers QoS ratings above or below what
it perceived. To simplify the problem of cheating by
raters, the approach of this paper considers the case
where all raters have their past experience with a certain
provider with 70% probability. Each of them has to rate
each provider with 50% probability.
At the end of each auction, the reputation of
each participating rater is updated based on the
utility gain/loss calculated by Eq. (1). To update the
reputation of a rater with the calculated utility gain,
the rater’s newly updated reputation is calculated by
accumulating the rater’s utility gain with the rater’s
current reputation. For example, if a rater, whose
reputation is 20 credits, gets a positive 0.6 utility
gain, the newly updated reputation is 20.6 credits. The
reputation of unfair raters is initially set to any random
numbers between 5 to 15 credits while for the fair raters
it is between 10 to 20 credits based on 100 transactions
previously conducted. The minimal credits of raters to
participate in auctions are initially set as 5 credits.
In the case of centralized architecture, the newly
updated reputation of a rater can be directly stored
in the centralized service registry. However, to make
these newly updated reputations publicly known to
others in the hybrid architecture, a Distributed Hash
Tables (DHT) technique[13] is applied to store an
index of raters’ reputation in each service registry’s
peers. This DHT method uses multiple hash functions
to map a single rater’s ID to corresponding trusted
neighbors that calculate and store the reputation of
raters individually. DHT also provides a basic operation
for retrieving the reputation of raters. When services

need the reputation of raters, they can retrieve them
using DHT operation with their ID as a parameter.
In a service selection phase, after completing the
calculations of relevant providers’ reputation, the
trust system then ranks these providers based on the
requester’s preferences. At the end, the requester will
get a sorted list of potential providers with which to
cooperate.
To select some of these providers for the requester,
the trust system ranks them based on the overall score
taking into account both (1) QoS score published by
the providers in service registries, and (2) reputation
score of the providers calculated by trust systems. Both
parameters’ thresholds are specified in the service
discovery request by the requester. The details of each
parameter are in the following.
(1) The QoS score is an average real number in
[0,1] specified by a provider when it publishes its QoS
information to a service registry. In this paper, service
providers specify QoS information by using the concept
of embedded tModel in WSDL files.
(2) The reputation score is a measure of a provider’s
trustworthiness. It can be computed by collecting
ratings from other services that have previously
interacted with the provider. The reputation of one
provider can be calculated by aggregating its ratings
submitted by raters into one percentage measure
Reputation in [0,1], each of which is weighted by raters’
reputation[1] as shown in Eq. (2).
n
X
Reputation =
wi  ratingi
(2)
i D1
where wi represents a weighted reputation in [0,1] of a
rater, ratingi represents a rating rated by a rater i , and n
represents a number of raters.
After taking into account both parameters, the overall
score of a provider in the ranking process can be
calculated as shown in Eq. (3) below.
Overall score D ˛  QoS score C ˇ  Reputation (3)
where ˛ and ˇ represent weights in [0,1], which is
subjectively determined by the requesters depending on
how important each source is (˛ + ˇ = 1.0).
Based on the requesters’ preferences, the N numbers
of providing services that satisfy the requesters’
threshold are then returned in descending order based
on the overall score. Services whose overall score
exceeds the trust level of 0.7, further proceed in
negotiate.
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5.2

VAM property test

Unfair raters should get a penalty, especially when the
majority of them are dishonest. This can be measured
by the average reputation of unfair raters when they
constantly provide unfairly high or low ratings to
potential providing services.
5.2.1

Centralized architecture

The number of unfair raters is varied from 10% to 90%,
with 10% increment per experiment. Each experiment
involves 50 raters, each of which rates QoS ratings of
providers based on given probabilities in Section 4. A
total of 10, 300, and 500 auction rounds (equal to the
number of the targeted providing services being rated)
have been executed to observe the reputation changes
incurred by cheating behavior of raters.
Figures 8 and 9 show that the average reputation
of unfair raters decreases when the number of raters
who lie increases under two different strategies. The
main difference is that when unfair raters perform
an overbidding strategy, their average reputation is
decreasing much more when compared to the random
bidding strategy. This is because in the overbid case,
the unfair raters who rate others bids very high have
more chance to win the auction compared to the unfair
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raters in the random bid case. However, their gains
of reputation are impaired by the VAM’s punishment
process made to the dishonest raters who submits the
highest QoS rating. In contrast, we can see that the
average reputation of fair raters from both the overbid
and random bid case increases as the result of the reward
granted by the VAM process.
In the underbid case, an unfair rater issues its bid
lower than it perceived. Before applying the RVAM’s
utility functions with the VAM’s calculation logic, the
average reputation of unfair raters are not getting much
decreased when they issue their bids lower than they
actually perceived as shown in Fig. 10.
This is because the unfair raters who rate others bids
very low have less chance to win the auction in the case
that they are in the minority. However, after applying
the RVAM’s utility functions, their gains of reputations
are degraded due to the VAM’s punishment process
made to the dishonest raters who submits the lowest
QoS rating as depicted in Fig. 11.
The results clearly demonstrate that the VAM helps
preventing cheating behavior by ensuring that unfair
raters get a penalty when they simply lie. This is evident
by the significant decrease in the average reputation
of unfair raters, especially when the majority of them
are dishonest. Also, the approach promotes a direct

Fig. 8 Changes in the reputation of raters for the overbid
case, when an unfair rater issues its bid higher than it
perceived.

Fig. 10 Changes in the reputation of unfair raters for the
underbid case before integrating with RVAM.

Fig. 9 Changes in the reputation of raters for the random
bid case, when an unfair rater issues its bid randomly either
a higher or lower bid than it perceived.

Fig. 11 Changes in the reputation of unfair raters for the
underbid case after integrating with RVAM.
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incentive for fair raters participating in an auction due
to the increasing of the average reputation of fair raters
when they give ratings truthfully in the auction.

the hybrid architecture discourages cheating behavior of
raters by ensuring that unfair raters get a penalty when
they simply lie in a distributed environment.

5.2.2

5.3

Hybrid architecture

The number of unfair raters varies from 10% to 90%,
with 10% increment per experiment. Each experiment
involves 100 000 raters, each of which rates QoS ratings
of providing services including retailers, warehouse,
and manufacturers requested by requesting services
based on given probabilities in Section 5.1. The same
total of auction rounds (10, 300, and 500 equal
to the number of the providers rated) have been
executed to observe the effect of changes in the
average reputation of raters. The providing services
were randomly grouped into 10 service registries, each
of which can contain the maximum of 50 providing
services.
The results of the overbid case and the random bid
case can discourage cheating by raters (the same as in
the case of centralized computing). However, in the
case of the underbid, unfair raters have slight gains
of reputation as depicted in Fig. 12. After integrating
with RVAM to detect the underbidding strategy of
unfair raters, the results demonstrate that the average
reputation of unfair raters decreases as depicted in
Fig. 13.
The results demonstrate that integrating RVAM in

Performance and scalability test

In the case of centralized architecture, the
computational overhead is measured in terms of
CPU usage and memory usage as shown in Table
1. The result shows the resource usage of deploying
VAM is comparable to the deployment without VAM.
We further measure the application’s response time
(second) with and without the VAM deployed. By
varying a number of raters from 50 to 1000, the
experiments are performed with 10 concurrent auctions,
each of which is conducted for one providing service
being rated.
The results show in the centralized architecture, the
response time is almost identical with/without VAM
(see Fig. 14). The performance overhead with VAM is
approximately 3.9% higher than without VAM, as the
number of raters is up to 1000.
In the case of the hybrid architecture, the
performance overhead with VAM is approximately
5.7% higher than without VAM for 10 000 raters (see
Fig. 15).
Table 1 CPU and Memory Usage with/ without VAM for
1000 raters.
With VAM
Without VAM

CPU usage (%)
53
48

Memory usage (%)
19.35
17.42

Fig. 12 Changes in the reputation of raters for the underbid
case before integrating with RVAM.
Fig. 14
Performance and scalability of centralized
architecture.

Fig. 13 Changes in the reputation of raters for the underbid
case after integrating with RVAM.

Fig. 15

Performance and scalability of hybrid architecture.
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5.4

Discussions

This paper aims to support trust-based services on a
very large scale to prevent unfair raters from cheating,
especially when they are in the majority, in the service
selection process. Based on the evaluation, integrating
VAM in the service architecture (centralized or hybrid)
can prevent benefits to dishonest raters. Each has its
own strengths and weaknesses that make it suitable for
a certain service environment.
The centralized architecture is suitable for smallscale service systems where the number of raters is not
very high. This architecture has a simple deployment
since all of the processing is controlled in a central
location. The hybrid architecture can scale to handle
larger number of raters and service providers.

6

Related Work

There are two main problems for the trust systems in
the use of the RBT. The first problem is that of unfair
ratings. A number of research studies have proposed
techniques to tackle the problem of unfair ratings
flowing from raters’ cheating behavior. These include:
(1) detective techniques[2, 14-16] , which detect unfair
ratings for predicting the trend of raters’ untruthful
behavior with statistical measures (e.g., clustering);
and (2) preventive techniques[3-5] , such as the side
payment schemes[17] , which discourages raters from
lying by giving them some kind of incentives (e.g.,
digital currency or credit), so that truthful reporting
maximizes the raters’ expected revenue.
Our approach generally belongs to the category of
preventive techniques. Preventive techniques whose
effectiveness replies on the majority of the participants
to be truthful are difficult to apply in the large
scale service oriented computing. In service-oriented
computing, participating services are loosely coupled
and dynamic in nature[18] , a large number of
services are expected to grow very quickly in
the future[12, 18, 19] . Therefore the contribution of our
approach is identifying a well-proven preventive
mechanism that is suitable to integrate with the
trust-based services even majority of participants are
dishonest.
Most
research
work
related
to
the
RBT[3-5, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21] has focused on devising a
mechanism to solve the problems of raters’ cheating
behavior. Only a few studies[22-24] have investigated the
overhead costs incurred by these proposed mechanisms
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when they are integrated with the original trust
systems. One study[23] evaluates the efficiency of its
proposed mechanism in terms of the consumption
of computing resources (i.e., CPU usage). Wang
et al.[22] also dealed with the overhead cost of
integrated mechanisms within trust systems. The
authors attempted to investigate the cost and efficiency
of the trust systems where such mechanisms are
applied. By generalizing individual small groups
of networks, the authors quantitatively analyzed
the behavior of complex networks based on the
mathematical equations. Another study is from Zhao
et al.[24] that integrates the mechanism as a number of
exchange messages between participants, realized in
relevant layers in a message feedback protocol.
These approaches assume the existence of centralized
party that maintains the digital currency or reputation
scores of participants to enforce their mechanisms’
truth-telling properties through rewarding or charging.
Therefore, the computation of such approaches is all
centralized in the trust system[25] . This imposes research
questions concerning their extension to support service
oriented computing, while achieving performance and
scalability.
All of the above demonstrate the need for a proper
architecture to integrate a preventive mechanism
with existing trust systems. This architecture needs
to maintain quality attributes of the trust system:
extensibility,
decentralization,
scalability,
and
performance.

7

Conclusions

In this paper, we integrate an auction mechanism
with trust systems to discourage raters from providing
untruthful ratings to other services, even in scenarios
where most of raters are dishonest. There are two
main contributions in this paper. The first contribution
is an extension to existing trust systems, adding the
extra capability to prevent cheating behavior on the
part of raters. The notion of the two architectures
with the VAM-based auction mechanism induces an
effective trust negotiation by preventing the trust
systems from being exploited by raters, even if the
majority of them lie about their ratings. Second, the
two architectures developed support the integration
of the VAM in term of optimized overhead costs
regarding the quality attributes of: (1) extensibility
in terms of reusing software components across two
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architectural designs; (2) scalability in terms of large
concurrent raters interacting with trust systems; (3)
decentralization for capturing the VAM’s truth-telling
property in distributed environments; and (4) no
significant performance overhead due to the end-to-end
delay incurred by a significant amount of messages in
highly scalable trust systems.
The VAM can effectively discourage raters from
submitting untruthful ratings. However, the VAM
assumes that each bidder submits his or her bid
independently. This assumption raises the issue of
how far the VAM can be applied in situations where
players can communicate with others outside of the
game. Thus, a number of participating services (e.g.,
raters) can communicate with each other and thus
manage their bids in an auction. Apart from bidding
collusion[26] , the VAM rule that bids are sealed might
cause some difficulty in enforcing bid privacy in
service oriented computing. In a common auction, some
tricky sellers might adopt a strategy of tracing the
bids of others before submitting their own bids in
the auction. In this way, such a seller can manage
his or her bid in order to gain benefits. Future
work involves providing architectural solutions to solve
these problems. Hence, in future work, the resulting
architecture will be proposed to support protection
against bidding collusion, as well as integrating some
security mechanisms to protect bid privacy.

[7]

[8]
[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

References
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

A. Jøsang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd, A survey of trust and
reputation systems for online service provision, Decision
Support Systems, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 618-644, 2007.
H. T. Nguyen, W. Zhao, and J. Yang, A trust and reputation
model based on Bayesian network for web services, in
Proc. 8th IEEE Int. Conf. on Web Services (ICWS), Miami,
Florida, USA, 2010, pp. 251-258.
E. Gerding, K. Larson, and N. Jennings, Mechanism
design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple
suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision, in
Proc. 11th Int. Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic
Commerce, 2009, pp. 1-124.
J. Miller, Game Theory at Work: How to Use Game Theory
to Outthink and Outmaneuver Your Competition. McGrawHill, 2003.
M. Yang, Q. Feng, Y. Dai, and Z. Zhang, A multidimensional reputation system combined with trust and
incentive mechanism in P2P file sharing systems, in
Proc. 27th Int. Conf. on Distributed Computing Systems
Workshops, Toronto, Canada, 2007, pp. 29-35.
L. V. Ahn, Auctions: Science of the web course
notes, http://www.scienceoftheweb.org/15-396/lectures/

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

lecture09.pdf, 2008.
S. Shetty, P. Padala, and M. P. Frank, A survey of marketbased approaches to distributed computing, Technical
report, no. TR03013, 2003.
P. Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton
University Press, New Jersey, USA, 2004.
W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive
sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 8-37,
1961.
A. Clayphan and T. Min’an, Mechanism simulation
framework for large distributed systems, Captone project
report, The University of New South Wales, Sydney,
Australia, 2008.
M. P. Papazoglou, P. Traverso, S. Dustdar, and F. Leymann,
Service-oriented computing: State of the art and research
challenges, IEEE Computer, vol. 40, no 11, pp. 38-45,
2007.
D. Wu, S. Ye, X. Wu, and J. Wei, Implementing servicecorrelation aware service selection, in Int. Conf. on Service
Sciences (ICSS), Hangzhou, China, 2010, pp. 383-387.
G. Urdaneta, G. Pierre, and M. V. Steen, A survey of DHT
security techniques, ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 43,
no. 2, 2011.
K. Karta, An investigation on personalized collaborative
filtering for web service selection, Master degree
dissertation, The University of Western Australia, Perth,
Australia, 2005.
Z. Li, S. Su, and F. Yang, WSrep: A novel reputation
model for web services selection, in Agent and Multi-Agent
Systems: Technologies and Applications; N.T. Nguyen,
A. Grzech, R. J. Howlett, L. C. Jain, Eds., Springer-Verlag,
2008, pp. 199-208.
Z. Malik and A. Bouguettaya, A rater credibility
assessment in web services interactions, World Wide Web
Journal, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 3-25, 2009.
R. Jurca and B. Faltings, An incentive-compatible
reputation mechanism, in Proc. the IEEE Conference on
E-Commerce, Newport Beach, CA, USA, 2003.
C. Wan, C. Ullrich, L. Chen, R. Huang, J. Luo, and
Z. Shi, On solving QoS-aware service selection problem
with service composition, in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. on Grid
and Cooperative Computing, 2008, pp. 467-474.
Y. Wang and J. Vassileva, Towards trust and reputation
based web service selection: A survey, International
Transactions on Systems Science and Applications, vol. 3,
no. 2, pp. 118-132, 2007.
Y. Liu, A. Ngu, and L. Zheng, QoS computation and
policing in dynamic web service selection, in Proc. 13th
Int. World Wide Web Conference, 2004, pp. 66-73.
L-H. Vu, M. Hauswirth, and K. Aberer, Towards P2Pbased semantic web service discovery with QoS support,
in Proc. Business Process Management Workshops, 2005,
pp. 18-31.
Y. Wang, Y. Hori, and K. Sakurai, Characterizing
economic and social properties of trust and reputation
systems in P2P environment, Journal of Computer Science
and Technology, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 129-140, 2008.

Suronapee Phoomvuthisarn et al.: Integrating a Market-Based Model in Trust-Based Service Systems

567

[23] J. Witkowski, Elicit honest reputation feedback in a
Markov setting, in Proc. 21st Int. Joint Conf. on
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Pasadena, California,
USA, 2009, pp. 330-335.
[24] H. Zhao, X. Yang, and X. Li, An incentive mechanism to
reinforce truthful reports in reputation systems, Journal of
Network and Computer Applications (JNCA), vol. 35, no
3, pp. 951-961, 2012.

[25] T. Moscibroda and S. Schmid, On mechanism design
without payments for throughput maximization, in
Proc. 28th IEEE Conf. on Computer Communications
(INFOCOM ‘09), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2009.
[26] F. Brandt and T. Sandholm, Efficient privacy-preserving
protocols for multi-unit auctions, in Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, A. Patrick, and
M. Yung, Eds., Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 298-312.

Suronapee Phoomvuthisarn is a lecturer
in the Faculty of Information Sciences
and Technology, Mahanakorn University
of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand. He
received his MS degree in information
sciences from the University of Pittsburgh
in 2007 and PhD in computer sciences and
engineering from the University of New
South Wales in 2011. His research interests include service
economics, trust computing, and software architecture. He is
currently the vice-dean for Public Relations and Student Affairs
of the Faculty of Information Sciences and Technology at
Mahanakorn University.

Liming Zhu is a principal researcher
at NICTA. NICTA is Australia’s centre
of excellence for Information and
Communications Technology R&D. He
also holds conjoint positions at University
of New South Wales (UNSW) and
University of Sydney. He received his PhD
in software engineering from UNSW in
2007. His current research interests include dependable systems
and operation, software architecture, and software engineering.

Yan Liu is an associate professor
in the Faculty of Engineering and
Computer Science, Concordia University,
Canada. Her current research involves
cloud computing, distributed systems,
software architecture, and model driven
development. She has extensive research
experience leading projects in domains
arranging from enterprise applications, to data intensive
workflows, to energy systems and smart grids. She has published
over sixty international journal and conference papers in these
areas since 2004. She was a Senor Scientist at Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory from 2009 to 2012. She received her PhD
in computer science from University of Sydney, Australia in
2004. Until December 2009, she was a Senior Researcher and
project leader at NICTA (National ICT Australia).

Ross Jeffery is Emeritus Professor of
Software Engineering in the School
of Computer Science and Engineering
at UNSW and Research Leader in
NICTA. He received his PhD in software
engineering from the University of New
South Wales. His current research interests
are in software engineering process and
product modeling and improvement, electronic process guides
and software knowledge management, software quality, software
metrics, software technical and management reviews, and
software resource modeling and estimation. His research has
involved many government and industry organizations over
a period of 30 years and has been funded from industry,
government, and universities. He has co-authored four books
and over one hundred and thirty research papers. He has served
on the editorial board of the IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, and the Wiley International Series in Information
Systems and the Journal of Empirical Software Engineering. He
is a founding member of the International Software Engineering
Research Network (ISERN). He was elected Fellow of the
Australian Computer Society for his contribution to software
engineering research.

